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CASE COMMENTS
MUNICIPAL IMMUNITY FROM ANTITRUST LIABILITY:
RECOGNITION OF A BROAD WELFARE EXEMPTION*
Fisher v. City of Berkeley, 106 S. Ct. 1045 (1986)
Petitioners, a group of landlords owning rental property in Berkeley, California, brought suit for declaratory and injunctive relief,
against the city on the grounds that its rent control ordinance2 violated
due process and equal protection under the fourteenth amendment. 3
The trial court upheld the ordinance on its face, but the state district
court reversed. 4 The California Supreme Court considered an antitrust
challenge to the ordinance as well 5 and ruled that the Sherman Act
did not preempt the rent control regulation.6 Affirming only the judgment below, the United States Supreme Court found no facial inconsistency with the federal antitrust laws and HELD, the ordinance's
rent controls lacked the element of concerted action necessary for an
7
antitrust violation.

*Editor's Note: This comment received the Huber Hurst Award for the outstanding Case
Comment Fall Semester, 1986.
1. In October 1984, Congress enacted the Local Government Antitrust Act, which prohibits
antitrust plaintiffs from recovering monetary damages from units of local government. See 15
U.S.C.A. §§ 34-36 (Supp. 1986).
2. BERKELEY, CAL., ORDINANCE 5261-N.S. (1980) (Rent Stabilization and Eviction for
Good Cause Ordinance); Fisher v. City of Berkeley, 106 S. Ct. 1045, 1047 (1986).
3. Fisher, 106 S. Ct. at 1047.
4. Id.
5. The California Supreme Court recognized the potential applicability of the United States
Supreme Court's holding in Community Communications Co. v. City of Boulder, 455 U.S. 40
(1982), which was decided while the California appeal was pending. 106 S. Ct. at 1047.
6. Fisher, 106 S. Ct. at 1048. First, the California Supreme Court held that "maximum
rents price-fixing implemented by local government is simply not of the same character as
price-fixing among private business defendants." Fisher v. City of Berkeley, 693 P.2d 281, 283
(Cal. 1984), affd, 106 S. Ct. 1045 (1986). Second, the court dispensed with the alternative rule
of reason test as follows: "We will not mechanically apply to municipal defendants rules of law
developed exclusively in the context of determining private business antitrust liability." 693
P.2d at 284. The court called for the development of a "public welfare defense" to alleged
antitrust violations by local governments, and concluded that the plaintiffs had not established
a conflict with the Sherman Act. Id. at 285, 289.
7. Fisher, 106 S. Ct. at 1051.
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Passage of the Sherman Act s and subsequent federal antitrust laws 9
reflect congressional emphasis on the overriding value of a regime of
competition. 10 The broad purpose of antitrust regulations is to prohibit
conduct that constitutes unreasonable restraints on trade", ensuring
the function of a genuinely free market. 12However, in a seminal case,
Parker v. Brown,' 3 the United States Supreme Court acknowledged
a countervailing concern: the maintenance of a system of dual
sovereigns. 14 Deferring to the state regulatory interest, the Parker
Court rejected an antitrust claim against a California regulation that
provided for governmental control over the prices of agricultural prod-

8. See Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1976) (Section 1 of the Act prohibits "every contract,
combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce
.... ").See also id. (Section 2 which states "[elvery person who shall monopolize, or attempt
to monopolize, or combine or conspire with any other person or persons, to monopolize any part
of the trade or commerce . . .shall be deemed guilty of a felony . .
").
9. See e.g., Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C.%§§ 12-27 (1976) (proscribes exclusive dealing and anticompetitive mergers; permits a private party to enforce the antitrust laws and recover treble
damages); Robinson-Patman Price Discrimination Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 13-13b, 21a (1976) (proscribes
anticompetitive price discrimination not justified by cost differentials); Federal Trade Commission
Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 41-58 (1976) (proscribes unfair trade practices).
10. City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 435 U.S. 389, 398 (1978). See United
States v. Topco Associates, 405 U.S. 596, 610 (1972) ("Antitrust laws in general, and the Sherman
Act in particular, are the Magna Carta of free enterprise."); United States v. South-Eastern
Underwriters Ass'n, 322 U.S. 533, 559 (1944) (Congress's purpose in enacting the Sherman Act
was to use its constitutional power "to make ours ... a competitive business economy").
11. See Sherman Act, supra note 8 (proscribing "restraints on trade").
12. See Northern Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 4 (1958) (the Sherman Act
"rests on the premise that the unrestrained interaction of competitive forces will yield the best
allocation of our economic resources, the lowest prices, the highest quality and the greatest
material progress . .
").
13. 317 U.S. 341 (1943). The phrases "Parkerdoctrine" and "state action doctrine" both
refer to the antitrust immunity the Parker Court extended to the states. See Comment, Alternative Approaches to MunicipalAntitrust Liability, 11 FORDHAM URB.L.J. 51, 51, n.3 (198283). See, e.g., City of Lafayette, 435 U.S. at 393, n.8 ("the term exemption is commonly used
by the courts as a shorthand expression for Parker's holding that the Sherman Act was not
intended by Congress to prohibit the State's anticompetitive restraints").
14. 317 U.S. at 359-68. The Parker Court stated that "[i]n a dual system of government
in which, under the Constitution, the states are sovereign, save only as Congress may constitutionally subtract from their authority, an unexpressed purpose to nullify a state's control over
its officers and agents is not lightly to be attributed to Congress." Id. at 351. The Court found
"nothing in the language of the Sherman Act or in its history which suggests that its purpose
was to restrain a state or its officers or agents from activities directed by its legislature." Id.
at 350-51. One commentator observed that the development of the state action exemption may
have occurred prior to Parker. See Richards, Exploring the FarReaches of the State Action
Exemption: Implications for Federalism, 57 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 274 n. 1 (1983).
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ucts. 15 The "Parkerdoctrine, '' 16 which authorizes certain anticompeti-

tive state policies, springs directly from the value of state sovereignty
within the federal system.
In several recent cases, the Supreme Court considered the extension of the Parkerexemption to actions by the states' political subdivisions.17 In City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co.,' for
instance, the Court considered whether the Parker doctrine applied
to municipally-provided monopoly services. A number of private
utilities asserted that several Louisiana municipalities had committed
antitrust violations in their operation of competing public utilities.1 9
The Court asserted that a "weighty presumption" exists against implied exclusions from the coverage of antitrust laws.- Balanced against
the Sherman Act's mandate of economic competition, however, is the
equally vital concern of ensuring state autonomy. 2 In Parker the
Court acknowledged that state sovereignty provides an exemption
from liability for anticompetitive conduct.2 The question in City of
15. 317 U.S. at 346. Parkerinvolved the California Agricultural Prorate Act which required
state officials "to restrict competition among the growers and maintain prices in the distribution
of their commodities to packers." Id. The Court concluded that "[t]he state . .. as sovereign,
imposed the restraint as an act of government which the Sherman Act did not undertake to
prohibit." Id. at 352.
16. See, e.g., City of Boulder, 455 U.S. at 53 ("The Parkerstate-action exemption reflects
Congress' intention to embody in the Sherman Act the federalism principle that the States
possess a significant measure of sovereignty under our Constitution.").
17. The Local Government Antitrust Act, supra note 1, defines local government to include
cities, counties, parishes, towns, townships, villages, school districts, sanitary districts, planning
districts, etc.. Antitrust Act, reprinted in, 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS, 4602,
4620. For purposes of this Commentary, the terms "political subdivision" and "local government"
as defined above are used synonymously.
18. 435 U.S. 389 (1978). City of Lafayette was the first case in which the Court considered
the application of the Parker doctrine to municipalities. The Court had previously considered
the extension of the Parker doctrine to a state bar, Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S.
773 (1975) (no antitrust immunity), and to a disciplinary rule by a state supreme court, Bates
v. State Bar of Arizona, 433 U.S. 350 (1977) (immunity granted). See Note, The Antitrust
Liability of Municipalities Under the Parker Doctrine, 57 B.U.L. REv. 368, 379-81 & n.68
(1977) (limited precedent involving municipal defendants in 30 years following Parker due to
assumption of municipal exemption).
19. 435 U.S. at 392. The amended counter-claim alleged that the petitioners conspired to
exclude competition by using long-term supply agreements and to displace the private utility
in certain areas by requiring its customers to purchase electricity as a condition of continued
gas and water service. Id. at 392 n.6.
20. Id. at 398-99. See Comment, supra note 13, at 64 & n.7 (citing cases for proposition
that implied exemptions from antitrust law are strongly disfavored).
21. City of Lafayette, 435 U.S. at 400. See discussion, supra note 15.
22. See New Motor Vehicle Board v. Orrin W. Fox Co., 439 U.S. 96, 103 (1978) (immunity
for actions of a private company when approved by a state administrative agency); Bates, 433

UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA JOURNAL OF LAW & PUBLIC POLICY

[Vol. I

Lafayette, therefore, was whether federalism, which compelled an
exemption for state regulation, extended with similar vitality to the
municipal level.
The cities asserted that the antitrust laws are intended only to
protect the public from private abuses and distinguished the traditional
public service function of municipalities from such monopolistic actions.2 Because the municipal operation of public utilities furthers only
the public interest, the cities argued, imposition of antitrust liability
would be unfounded.- 4 The immediate check presented by the political
process assures official accountability. 2
The plurality, however, refused to recognize an exemption for
municipalities. Despite accepting the presumption that municipalities
act to serve the local public interest, the Court reasoned that extending
the Parkerdoctrine to municipal policies would lead to the danger of
economic decisionmaking on a purely parochial basis. 26 The plurality
stated that municipalities could not be trusted to act in the broader
interests of the regional and national economies, particularly when
they act in a proprietary role as service providers.- The essence of
the Sherman Act and its legislative progeny would therefore not be
served by a municipal antitrust exemption. In assessing economic impacts on a wide scale, the plurality observed that "extraterritorial"
economic competitors and their customers possess no traditional political recourse if affected adversely by a municipal policy. 2 Finally, to
allow municipalities freedom from antitrust scrutiny could prevent an

U.S. at 360 (immunity of disciplinary rule of the Arizona Supreme Court as an "affirmative
command" of the state high court and thus "compelled by direction of the State acting as
sovereign"). But see Cantor v. Detroit Edison Co., 428 U.S. 579, 592-93 (1976) (mere regulation
by state does not immunize private conduct from antitrust laws); Goldfarb, 421 U.S. at 790
(activity must be "required" by state acting as sovereign).
23. 435 U.S. at 403-05.
24. Id. at 403-06. Justice Brennan rejected the petitioner's argument that the anti-monopoly
principles of the antitrust laws are inconsistent with the very nature of government operating
as a monopoly in the public interest. Id. at 405 n.31.
25. Id. at 406-07. The plurality rejected as well the notion that the requirement of federal
antitrust regulation is obviated by the political process's assurance of public welfare. Congress
did not leave fundamental national antitrust policy "to the vagaries of the political process." Id.
26. Id. at 408. "If municipalities were free to make economic choices counseled solely by
their own parochial interests and without regard to their anticompetitive effects, a serious chink
in the armor of antitrust protection would be introduced at odds with the comprehensive national
policy Congress established." Id.
27. Id. at 403-04 (citing the danger that a municipality's economic choices may be made on
the basis of "realizing maximum benefits to itself without regard to extraterritorial impact and
regional efficiency").
28. Id. at 406, 407 & n.33.
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efficient allocation of resources and create the threat of economic dislocation.2
In a dissenting opinion, Justice Stewart predicted that the plurality's holding would interfere with the "fundamentals" of state government.30 The ability of states and localities to structure and regulate
the delivery of traditional governmental services would be compromised. 31 Justice Stewart also argued that the treble antitrust damages could result in municipal bankruptcy, inequitable burdens placed
on local taxpayers, and a chilling effect on local experimentation and
32
innovation with social and economic programs.
While Justice Stewart raised some valid considerations, the plurality held that cities are not themselves sovereign and should not receive
the degree of deference accorded states under the principles of
federalism.3 The Parker exemption is limited, therefore, either to an
act of the state as sovereign, or to acts of its subdivisions3' pursuant
to state policy.3 In respect to the latter, the state must have "authorized" a municipality to act anticompetitively.- Municipal policy is
authorized when a state permits its subdivisions to act in particular
policy areas and when the state "contemplated" the anticompetitive
7

conduct.3

29. Id. at 408. "When these bodies act as owners and providers of services, they are fully
capable of aggrandizing other economic units with which they interrelate, with the potential of
serious distortion of the rational and efficient allocation of resources ..
" Id.
30. Id. at 438 (Stewart, J., joined by White, J., Blackmun, J., and Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
31. Id. at 439.
32. Id. at 43940. The plurality, however, expressly reserved the question of imposing
treble damages for antitrust violations. Id. at 401-02. See City of Boulder, 455 U.S. at 56, n.20
(also reserving the damages question); Cantor, 428 U.S. at 579 (Stewart, J., dissenting) (contemplating the prospect of massive treble damage liabilities payable ultimately by the customers
of a public utility); 435 U.S. at 442 n.1 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (observing that the judgment
sought by the petitioners in City of Lafayette amounted to $28,000 for each family of four who
resided in the defendant cities). See generally Civiletti, The Falloutfrom Community Communications Co. v. City of Boulder: Prospectsfor a Legislative Solution, 32 CATH. U.L. REV. 379,
385 (1983) (local governments could not satisfy treble damages and remain solvent; the ability
to provide essential services would be severely hindered); Poli, Antitrust Treble Damages as
Applied to Local Governmental Entities: Does the Punishment Fit the Defendant? 1980 ARIZ.
ST. L.J. 411, 413-15 (discussing the threat of municipal bankruptcies).
33. 435 U.S. at 412. "Cities are not themselves sovereign; they do not receive all the federal
deference of the States that create them." Id.
34. See supra note 17.
35. 435 U.S. at 413.
36. Id. at 414, 416-417.
37. Id at 415. An adequate state mandate for anticompetitive municipal activities exists
when "from the authority given a governmental entity to operate in a particular area, . . . the
legislature contemplated the kind of action complained of." Id. (quoting from City of Lafayette,
532 F.2d at 434).
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In City of Lafayette, the Court suggested that it would adopt a
two-prong test for assessing state authorization of municipal action:
first, the state policy must be "clearly articulated and affirmatively
expressed," and second,the municipal action must be "actively supervised" by the state.3 Although not explicitly adopted by the City of
Lafayette plurality,39 this test was soon endorsed by a majority of the
Court.4° Applying this new standard in Community Communications
Co., Inc. v. City of Boulders1 the Court found insufficient authorization
for a municipal licensing policy which inhibited the market expansion
of a cable television company. The City of Boulder majority ruled that
Parker'sstate action requirement was not satisfied by a state constitutional provision authorizing a home rule charter.- The City of Boulder
had exercised this home rule authority in granting a license to a single
company to supply cable television services. After several years, the
city imposed an "emergency" three-month moratorium on all such
licensing to encourage, ironically, the development of a more competitive market.a The petitioner filed suit under Section 14 of the Sherman

38. 435 U.S. at 410. The City of Lafayette Court cited approvingly the standard adopted
in Bates, 433 U.S. 350, 360 (1977) (the first articulation of the two-prong test). Id. The Court
applied the two-prong test in both California Retail Liquor Dealers Ass'n v. Midcal, 445 U.S.
97 (1980) and Orrin, 439 U.S. 96 (1978).
39. But see Town of Hallie v. City of Eau Claire, 471 U.S. 34, 40 (1985) (the City of
Lafayette plurality only "suggested" that the two-prong test apply to preserve states' freedom
to regulate).
40. See supra note 38. The Court limited application of the test's second prong to situations
where the party claiming state authorization was private. See, e.g., Town of Hallie, 471 U.S.
34, 40 & n.3 (1985). See also Churchwell, The Federal Antitrust Implications of Local Rent
Control: A Plaintiffs Primer, 12 PEPPERDINE L. REV. 919, 939 (1985) (Midcal's "active state
supervision" prong applied only to private parties); Areeda, Antitrust Immunity for "State
Action" After Lafayette, 95 HARv. L. REV. 435, 445 n.59 (1981) (recalling that the City of
Lafayette plurality quoted the second prong of the Bates test but did not apply it to a municipal
claim of immunity).
41. 455 U.S. 40 (1982). The Court concluded that because Boulder's actions did not satisfy
the clear articulation and affirmative expression criterion, it need not reach the question whether
the licensing policy must or could satisfy Midcal's active state supervision test. Id. at 51 n.14.
Although the Court was presumably prepared to apply both prongs in City of Boulder, the
Town of Hallie Court held that the second prong need not be met in the context of a municipal
defendant. See supra note 40.
42. 455 U.S. at 55. The Colorado Home Rule Amendment stated that "[s]uch charter and
the ordinances made pursuant thereto in such matters shall supersede ... any laws of the state
in conflict therewith." COLO. CONST. art. XX, § 6. But see Local Government Antitrust Act,
supra note 1, § 36 (granting immunity from monetary damages to local governments acting
"within their authority"; this authority will most often stem from broad grants of home rule
powers).
43. 455 U.S. at 45.
44. See 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1976).
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Act for the consequent limitation on the expansion of its services. 45
Reversing the Tenth Circuit, the Court ruled that the city had not
met the criteria for a Parker exemption.
The majority reiterated the City of Lafayette's plurality view that
Parker's obeisance to state sovereignty did not summarily extend to
municipalities. 4" The Court rejected the argument that Colorado's
Home Rule Amendment vested in the city every power over municipal
affairs otherwise retained by the Colorado State Legislature.47 Characterizing the state position as one of mere neutrality, the Court ruled
there was no clearly articulated state policy on municipal cable television franchising. 48 The majority concluded that to permit immunity
based upon this general grant of power to enact ordinances under
home rule would eviscerate the requirements of a clearly articulated
49
and affirmatively expressed state policy.

The Court did extend a Parkerexemption to a municipality, however, in Town of Hallie v. City of Eau Claire.- A central question
before the Court was whether an exemption would be granted when
a state authorizes, but does not compel, municipal activities. 5' Also at
issue was whether the second prong of the post-City of Lafayette test,
the requirement of active state supervision, applies to municipalities.In Town of Hallie, several small towns alleged that the larger municipality of Eau Claire used its control over regional sewage treatment5
to monopolize sewage collection and transportation services as well.

45. 455 U.S. at 46-47.
46. Id. at 50, 53-54.
47. Id. at 53 & n.15. The Court distinguished Denver Urban Renewal Auth. v. Byrne, 618
P.2d 1374, 1381 (Colo. 1980) ("By virtue of Article X, a home rule city is not inferior to the
General Assembly concerning its local and municipal affairs.").
48. 455 U.S. at 55-56. See Cantor, 428 U.S. 579, 585 (1976) (mere state neutrality is
insufficient for municipal immunity).
49. 455 U.S. at 56. The Court did not reach the second (active state supervision) prong.
See supra notes 40-41.
50. 471 U.S. 34 (1985).
51. Id. at 36. Compare Goldfarb, 421 U.S. at 790-92 (application of strict compulsion standard
to private party) with City of Lafayette, 435 U.S. at 415 (application of a more deferential
"contemplation" standard to anticompetitive municipal conduct).
52. 471 U.S. at 36. Because the City of Boulder Court did not reach the issue of the
applicability of the second prong to municipal conduct, the questions was left open for the Town
of Hallie Court. But see Comment, supra note 13, at 63 (the City of Boulder Court "implicitly
equated municipalities and private parties by indicating strongly that [they] must satisfy [an
identical standard].").
53. Under the Federal Water Pollution Control Act (renamed the Clean Water Act after
amendments) the federal government provides funds to assist larger cities in building a sewage
treatment facility serving a large service area. See 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1376 (1985).
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The Court first assessed a Wisconsin statute granting municipalities
the authority to construct sewage system. 4 Observing that a related
state statute empowered a municipality to fix the limits of sewage
services to surrounding areas, the Court reasoned that the Wisconsin
legislature clearly contemplated that municipalities would engage in
anticompetitive conduct.' Affirming both the federal district court and
the Seventh Circuit, the Town of Hallie majority ruled that the defendant city was immune from antitrust liability.According to the Court's decision in Town of Hattie, a state need
57
not explicitly empower a city to engage in anticompetitive activity.
Departing from the clearly articulated and affirmatively expressed
prong of City of Boulder, the Court instead required only that a
municipality act according to a "clearly expressed" state policy. Echoing Justice Stewart's dissent in City of Lafayette, the majority asserted
that requiring explicit authorization would compromise the authority
of municipalities to govern themselves. 59 Nor does this clear expression
standard require that a municipality be "compelled" to act. ° In adopting a more deferential standard, the Court asserted that municipalities
are presumed to act in the public interest.61 The Court outlined a
number of factors supporting this presumption: 'municipal conduct is
more likely to be exposed to public scrutiny than private conduct;
many municipalities are subject to sunshine laws; and municipal officers
are subject to the electoral process.62

54. 471 U.S. at 41-42. A city is granted authority to "construct .
sewage systems" and
is permitted to "describe with reasonable particularity the district to be served." Wis. STAT.
§ 62.18(1) (1982).
55. 471 U.S. at 40-41.
56. Id. at 38.
57. Id. at 42. The Court cited Orrin, 439 U.S. 96, 109 (1978) (Parkerexemption extended
to state statutory plan regulating automobile dealership franchising).
58. 471 U.S. at 40.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 45-46. The Court rejected language in Cantor, 428 U.S. at 579, and Goldfarb,
421 U.S. at 773, which held that the Parker state action test requires a state to "compel" a
city to act. Id. These cases are distinguishable because they involved private parties, not
municipalities. The presumption is that a city acts in the public interest, while a private party
acts on its own behalf. See supra notes 38-41. But see City of Lafayette, 435 U.S. at 425 n.6
(Burger, C.J., concurring) (test would require a state to compel, not merely contemplate, anticompetitive conduct of a city).
61. 471 U.S. at 45. "A municipality is an arm of the State. We may presume, absent a
showing to the contrary, that the municipality acts in the public interest." Id.
62. Id. at 45 & n.9.
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The Court also dispensed altogether with the active state supervision prong as applied to municipal conduct. 63 The majority here asserted that little danger exists that a municipality would violate the
inherently benign purposes of local government. The only possible
danger, an assertion of parochial interests at the expense of more
eminent economic goals, is assuaged by the primary requirement that
a municipality act under a clearly expressed state policy. 64
In sharp contrast, the instant Court held that Berkeley's rent control ordinance was not subject to the state action scrutiny that was
65
imposed on the municipalities' actions in Parkerand City of Lafayette.
The Court reasoned that the element of concerted action required for
a violation of the Sherman Act was absent in the regulatory plan.The rent ceilings imposed by the ordinance and implemented by an
appointed Rent Stabilization Board were unilaterally imposed by a
governmental body, exclusive of private involvement.67 Central to the
Sherman Act is the proscription of concerted activities.6 However,
the instant ordinance authorized only unilateral governmental action
by a municipal board acting in furtherance of municipal policy6 9 The

63. Id. at 45. The Court held that active state supervision is still required where the
anticompetitive conduct is by private parties. See Southern Motor Carrier Rate Conference,
Inc. v. United States, 471 U.S. 48 (1985); Midcal, 445 U.S. at 97.
64. 471 U.S. at 47. "The danger [of furthering purely parochial interests] is minimal, however, because of the requirement that the municipality act pursuant to a clearly articulated
state policy." Id. But see City of Lafayette, 435 U.S. at 403-08; supra notes 26-29 (warning of
the possibility of general inefficiency caused by economic parochialism).
65. 106 S. Ct. 1045 (1986). In a concurring opinion, Justice Powell rejected what was
essentially a threshold analysis for consideration of a Parker state action exemption. Id. at 1051.
In Fisher, the rent control plan had been expressly authorized by the State Legislature. Id.
The concurrence asserted that Town of Hallie held a general grant of authority to regulate in
an area suffices to exempt an ordinance from the antitrust laws; the Legislature's ratification
of a particular rent control plan, therefore, also warrants a state action exemption. Id. at 1053.
In advocating a Parker analysis, Justice Brennan asserted that the majority "discards over 40
years of carefully considered precedent." Id. at 1053.
66. Id. at 1049.
67. Id. See Comment, supra note 13, at 51 n.2 (arguing that the legislative history of the
Sherman Act indicates that it was directed at abuses of private business and capital). See, e.g.,
21 CONG. REC. 2457, 2459, 2460 (1890) (remarks of Sen. Teller) (antitrust law seeks to curb
'these great trusts, these great corporations, these large moneyed institutions").
68. Fisher, 106 S. Ct. at 1049. "There can be no liability under § 1 in the absence of
agreement." Id. Sections 1 & 2 of the Sherman Act proscribe "combinations" and "conspiracies"
in restraint of trade. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-2 (1976).
69. 106 S.Ct. at 1050. Under the Berkeley Rent Control Ordinance, the Rent Stabilization
Board controls maximum rent levels of every applicable residential unit; the City unilaterally
removed this power from the owners of the property and granted it to the Board. BERKELEY,
CAL., ORDINANCE 5261-N.S. (1980).
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Court described the ordinance as a "pure regulatory scheme." 70 As
such, the Court ruled that Berkeley's rent control regime lacked the
element of concerted anticompetitive conduct between private
economic interests that establishes a per se violation of the Sherman
Act.71 Because the ordinance was not facially inconsistent with the
federal antitrust laws, the Court failed to reach the exemption analysis
adopted by City of Lafayette and its progeny. 72
The instant case represents a fundamental shift in the Supreme
Court's approach to claims of municipal antitrust liability. For the
first time in the municipal context, the Court exchanged an anticipated
Parker-City of Lafayette analysis for a simple, threshold antitrust
inquiry. 73 In doing so, the Court departed dramatically from a recent
line of cases which consistently applied some version of a state authorization test. This judicial shift followed in the wake of widespread
legislative 74 and executive 75 dissatisfaction with municipal exemptions,
particularly with the City of Boulder decision. Alternately, however,
the instant case may be viewed as the culmination of an increasingly
expansive presumption of municipal immunity from antitrust challenges. 76 Just as Parker embodied a concern that Congress did not

70. 106 S. Ct. at 1051.
71. Id. at 1051. Because the rent controls cannot be characterized as a per se violation of
§ 1, 'the Court cannot say that the Ordinance is facially inconsistent with the federal antitrust
laws." Id. Indeed, the Ordinance was twice approved by local initiative. Id. at 1052. Prior to
1974, the State Legislature was obligated to approve all changes in municipal charters. Id. See
CAL. CONST. art. IX, § 3 (1972). In 1972, Berkeley's citizens first approved by city-wide
referendum a charter amendment that the California Supreme Court later invalidated. Birkenfeld
v. City of Berkeley, 550 P.2d 1001 (Cal. 1976). After the defect was cured, Berkeley's electorate
adopted a second rent control ordinance. 106 S. Ct. at 1052 (Powell, J., concurring).
72. 106 S. Ct. at 1051. The instant court cited Rice v. Norman Williams Co., 458 U.S. 654,
659 (1982), which held that a Parker preemption inquiry is required only where legislation is
found to conflict "irreconcilably" with the antitrust laws. 106 S. Ct. at 1048.
73. 106 S. Ct. at 1053 (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("Today's decision discards over 40 years
of carefully considered precedent.").
74. See Local Government Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 34-36 (Supp. 1986) (prohibiting
recovery of monetary damages for municipal antitrust violation).
75. See LOCAL GOVERNMENT ANTITRUST LIABILITY - THE BOULDER DECISION:
HEARINGS BEFORE THE SENATE COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY,

97th Cong., 2d Sess.,

(June 10, 1982) (the federal government will not seek criminal sanctions against state subdivision
violators of the federal antitrust laws) (testimony of Asst. Att'y Gen. William F. Baxter). See
Williamson, Commentary: the Reagan Administration's Position on Antitrust Liability of
Municipalities, 32 CATH. U.L. REV. 371 (1983) (assessing the Reagan Administration's concern
over the federalism implications of City of Boulder).
76. But see Richards, supra note 14, at 314 ("To speak of a return to unqualified local
autonomy at a time when global complexities and interrelationships require greater harmony is
to retreat to the past.").

CASE COMMENTS

intend the Sherman Act to constrain the regulatory autonomy of states
within Commerce Clause bounds, the instant decision registers an
analogous concern for the independence of municipalities. 77 Whether
viewed as an acknowledgement of local sovereignty or a recognition
of a broad public welfare exception for municipal activity, 78 the instant
decision marks a fundamentally new approach to analyzing municipal
antitrust problems.
Indeed, Town of Hattie signaled this impending shift in antitrust
analysis. In substituting a single "clear expression" standard for the
two-prong test previously adopted by the Court, the majority profoundly eased the municipal burden of demonstrating state authorization. Extending a Parker exemption for the first time to a municipal
service provider, the Toum of Hallie Court indicated a willingness to
presume that municipalities act inherently in the public interest. 7- The
instant Court's departure from the Parker framework suggests the
acceptance of a public welfare exception to antitrust liability.80 Because
of this presumption of municipal beneficence, the instant Court immunizes in sweeping terms all "unilateral"sl actions of local governments. The requisite nexus between a state and its subdivisions had
8 2 That
already been diminished considerably under Town of Hallie.
the instant Court dispenses entirely with the search for state action
may thus be construed as the last step in a logical progression.
77. See Arthur, Farewell to the Sea of Doubt: Jettisoning the ConstitutionalSherman Act,
74 CALIF. L. REv. 266, 347-48 (1986) (the legislative history of the Sherman Act demonstrates
a prohibition of individual and not state action; the same argument applies to local governments
because there is no indication the 1890 Congress intended to cover the activities of local governments). See also Local Government Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 34-36 (Supp. 1986) (no congressional intent to bind local governments); Civiletti, supra note 32, at 390 (proposal for a federal
amendment to the antitrust laws which establishes a Parker-type immunity for local governments).
78. See, e.g., Fisher, 106 S. Ct. at 1056-57 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (arguing that the
majority has forged a new, broad public interest exemption for municipalities).
79. Id. See Fisher v. City of Berkeley, 693 P.2d 261, 285 (Cal. 1984) (California Supreme
Court calling for the development of a public welfare defense for local governments confronted
with antitrust challenges), affd, 106 S. Ct. 1045 (1986).
80. See Local Government Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 34-36 (Supp. 1986) (the Act responded
to recent Court decisions which "spawned an increasing number of antitrust suits that could
undermine a local government's ability to govern in the public interest, and which have become
destructive of the public trust").
81. 106 S. Ct. at 1051. The Court recognized that there may be cases involving official
corruption in which a municipal-administered price stabilization scheme is really a private pricefixing conspiracy. The landlord's role in the program, however, "does not alter the restraint's
unilateral nature." Id. But see generally Churchwell, supra note 40 (advocating the notion that
antitrust challenges to rent control regulations should include the possibility of "combinations"
between landlords and municipal officials, and between tenants and officials).
82. See supra note 63 and accompanying text.
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The Town of Hallie Court emphasized the political check of the
electoral process, a crucial distinction between local governments and
private corporations. The instant Court also diverged from the holding
of City of Lafayette, in which Justice Brennan rejected the "politicalredress argument" where local actions have "extraterritorial" economic
impacts.8 Town of Hallie also anticipated the instant Court's presumption that a municipality acts through economic and social regulation,
not to further any private interest, but only to serve the public trust. 8
The Court now appears unwilling to assign improper, anticompetitive
motives to municipalities acting in a regulatory capacity. ,
As was demonstrated in City of Lafayette, municipalities act also
in proprietary roles, providing an array of traditional services.- Although a distinction has been drawn between regulatory and proprietary activities in determining the requisite degree of state authorization
of municipal conduct, s7 the Court has rejected the notion that it should
more carefully scrutinize the latter.1 The proprietary activities of the
municipality in Town of Hallie, for example, were subjected to a more
diminished state authorization standard than the municipality in City

83. City of Lafayette, 435 U.S. at 406, 407 n.33 (observing that, when affected customers
are outside jurisdiction, there is no opportunity for the political redress of grievances electorally).
84. 106 S. Ct. at 1051. See supra note 83 for possible exceptions to the presumption.
85. See, e.g., City of Boulder, 455 U.S. at 66 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) ("Competition
simply does not and cannot further the interests that lie behind most social welfare legislation.").
86. See City of Lafayette, 435 U.S. at 418-426 (Burger, C.J., concurring) (advocating a
distinction that would exempt "integral operations in the area of traditional governmental functions" but not proprietary, profit-making enterprises) (quoting National League of Cities v.
Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976)). But see Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Auth., 469
U.S. 528 (1985) (the attempt to draw the boundaries of state regulatory immunity, for Commerce
Clause purposes, in terms of "traditional governmental function" is "not only unworkable but
is inconsistent with established principles of federalism ....
"); Rogers, Municipal Anti-trust
Liability in a FederalistSystem, 1980 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 305, 338 (the state sovereignty principles
of Usery should be significantly more restricted than the state action antitrust doctrine).
87. The Court of Appeals in City of Boulder granted the city a Parker exemption and
distinguished City of Lafayette on the grounds that "no proprietary interest of the City is here
involved." 630 F.2d 704, 708 (10th Cir. 1980). See Areeda, supra note 40, at 443 (arguing that
City of Lafayette could be read as imposing antitrust liability on local governments only when
they acted in a proprietary rather than a governmental capacity); Note, The Preemption Alternative To Municipal Antitrust Liability, 51 GEo. WASH. L. REV. 145, 169 (1983) (asserting
that municipalities should be subject to antitrust liability only for proprietary activities).
88. See City of Lafayette, 435 U.S. at 433 (Stewart, J., dissenting) (the distinction between
proprietary and governmental activities is a "quagmire"); Local Government Antitrust Act, 15
U.S.C. §§ 34-36 (Supp. 1986) (refusal to adopt test focusing on nature of the activity because
of interpretive difficulties). See generally Thomas, City of Lafayette's State Action Test Reformulated: A Meaningful Standard of Antitrust Immunity for Cities, 1980 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 345,
358-60 (analysis of proprietary versus governmental distinction).
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of Lafayette. Although the instant Court did discard the City of
Lafayette framework in the context of a "pure regulatory scheme,"
the Court's previous use of a single test for both kinds of activities
suggests that the emergence of a heightened standard for proprietary
conduct is unlikely. Antitrust liability requires concerted action, and
the instant Court concludes that the unilateral governmental functions
of municipalities will not suffice. Whether regulatory or proprietary,
virtually all traditional municipal activity will likely be upheld under
the current standard. Indeed, the types of municipal activities proscribed by the Court in City of Lafayette and City of Boulder are
clear examples of the unilateral governmental action upheld by the
instant Court.
The Supreme Court emphasized its willingness to create expansive
municipal immunity from antitrust liability in a policy area of enduring
controversy:m rent controls. Rent ceilings have been imposed on a
substantial percentage of multi-family rental housing nationally.- Yet
economists and jurists alike have pointed to rent control as an example
of governmental regulation which acts as a market disincentive. 91 Because rent controls discourage the maintenance and expansion of lowand middle-income housing, they argue, these regulations amount to
trade restraints subject to the federal antitrust laws.9 The market
disincentive argument, however, has not gone undisputed. Some commentators, for example, have detailed the inapplicability of the competitive market model to rental housing.-3 They distinguish "first gen89. On the other hand, Berkeley's rent control regime was not proprietary and did not
have "extraterritorial" impacts. The instant Court's shift, therefore, was not as problematical
as it could have been. Notably, Justice Brennan concurred in Town of Hallie but sharply
dissented from the Court's new approach in the instant case. 106 S. Ct. at 1053 (Brennan, J.,
dissenting).
90. See THE REPORT OF THE PRESIDENTS COMMISSION ON HOUSING 89 (1982) (over
one-third of U.S. households are presently sheltered by rental housing); T. THIBODEAUOFF,
RENT REGULATION AND THE MARKET FOR RENTAL HOUSING SERVICES

(1981) (rent controls

have been enacted in over 200 cities nationally by the early 1980's including municipalities
comprising over one-half the population of California).
91. See, e.g., Churchwell, supranote 40; Millspaugh, Municipal Low-Income Housing Controls: An Intrusive Special Interest Abuse of Police Powers, 17 PAC. L.J. 349 (1985); Hirsch,
From "Food for Thought" to "EmpiricalEvidence" About Consequences of Landlord-Tenant
Laws, 69 CORNELL L. REV. 604 (1984) (observing that rent control schemes often result
ultimately in a decreasing quantity of housing stock and in deteriorating conditions).
92. See Churchwell, supra note 40; Weitzman, Economics and Rent Regulation: A Call
for a New Perspective, 13 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 975, 978, 986 (1984) (assessing
traditional authority for the notion that rent control regulations lead inevitably to under-maintenance, reduction of housing, and abandonment).
93. See Weitzman, supra note 92, at 979 (arguing that rent control regulation is more
complex and sophisticated than a simple price ceiling in a competitive market).
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eration" rent controls, characterized primarily by their inflexible response to rising landlord costs, with "second generation" controls designed to enable landlords to recoup a reasonable rate of return on
their capital investment.9
The challenged Berkeley ordinance falls into the second category,
as do most rent control plans currently used throughout the nation.
The Berkeley ordinance provides for regular, market-wide increases
in rent ceilings. 95 If reasonable rates of return were permitted, rent
control regulations would no longer be subject to attack as prohibited
restraints on trade. 96 The City of Berkeley operated its regulatory
scheme neither to ensure an independent economic advantage in the
housing market 9" nor to obstruct the market expansion of individual
landlords. In these respects, the ordinance avoided the infirmities of
City of Lafayette and City of Boulder, respectively. Berkeley's rent
control scheme functions simply as a regulation which affects all market
participants equally, and possesses additional flexibility characteristic
of moderate second generation rent controls.
The Supreme Court's City of Lafayette and City of Boulder decisions succeeded in generating a great deal of adverse public debate.
Detractors argued that readily available municipal antitrust liability
was simply incompatible with the function of local government, as well
as with the essential purposes of the Sherman Act.9 8 Abuses would
be better addressed, they argued, by existing state and federal laws.99
Municipal liability also threatened to vastly increase the number of
suits against cities by disaffected private interests. The available
statistics confirmed this fear. - The response from the judicial, execu94. Id. at 985 (characterizing second generation controls as those which allow upward
flexibility for rents in response to rising landlord costs). See Note, Rent Control and Landlords'
Property Rights: The Reasonable Return Doctrine Revived, 33 RUTGERS L. REV. 165 (1980)
(advocating that courts should abandon the reasonable return doctrine and adopt instead a test
holding controls unconstitutionally severe only if they lead to abandonment by landlords).
95. 106 S. Ct. at 1047 (under the Berkeley scheme landlords may raise rents above price
ceilings pursuant to an annual general adjustment by the Rent Stabilization Board). See Fisher
v. City of Berkeley, 693 P.2d 261, 289-98 (Cal. 1984) (the ordinance, adopted in Berkeley's 1980
referendum, provided procedural safeguards necessary to protect landlords from confiscatory
rent ceilings), affd, 106 S. Ct. 1045 (1986).
96. But see Churchwell, supra note 40.
97. 106 S. Ct. at 1051, n.2.
98. See supra note 79.
99. Williamson, supra note 75, at 378 (arguing that state and federal provisions such as 42
U.S.C. § 1983 (1976), conflict of interest laws, sunshine laws, public disclosure laws, and freedom
of information laws may prevent local government abuses).
100. See Mayo, The Local Government Antitrust Act: A Comment on the Constitutional
Questions, 50 J. MR L. & CoM. 805, 807 (1985) (in the wake of City of Boulder, 200-300
antitrust cases were pending against local governments in 1983).
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tive, and legislative branches alike was negative. Despite the ostensibly strict City of Boulder standard, lower courts found municipal immunity in a wide variety of circumstances.°1 The Clayton Act's provision for treble damages often went unenforced against municipalities. 102
As perhaps indicative of its approach to federalism, the Reagan Administration appeared unwilling to vigorously pursue municipal violations
of the antitrust laws.103
The most pointed response, however, came from Congress. Passage
of the Local Government Antitrust Act of 1984104 served as a direct
legislative response to the Court's recognition of increased municipal
liability. Eliminating the possibility of monetary damages for municipal
antitrust violations, the Act effectively alleviated the danger of antitrust judgments depleting municipal resources. 10 5 The instant case succeeds in more completely addressing the problems of municipal liability
by recognizing its profound incompatibility with the very essence of
local government: the enhancement of the public well being.
The instant case demonstrates a discernible trend in antitrust law
toward granting virtually absolute immunity to local governments.
Prior to the past term, the Supreme Court had required municipal
antitrust defendants to demonstrate a degree of state authorization
of the challenged conduct. Within this framework, the Court has gradually eased the requisite nexus between state and local policy. Municipal
immunity was derived directly from the exemption granted to states
under the Parkerdoctrine. Yet the instant case effectively severs the
link between state action and local regulation. The underlying rationale
for Parker was the value of state autonomy within a federal system.
The Court, in recognizing a broad public welfare antitrust exemption,
defers to the analogous value of limited local regulatory sovereignty.
Matt Farmer
Kathy Gaertner

101. The instant case is a good example. See Fisher v. City of Berkeley, 693 P.2d 261 (Cal.
1984), affd, 106 S. Ct. 1045 (1986). See also Churchwell, supra note 40, at 939 & n.138 (cases
cited).
102. See Churchwell, supra note 40, at 946 & n.185.

103. See supra note 75 (testimony of Asst. Att'y Gen. William F. Baxter).
104. See Local Government Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 34-36 (Supp. 1986). "No damages
. . . may be recovered . . . from any local government, or official or employee acting in an
official capacity." Id. at § 35.
105. See Note, Dr. Boulderlove; or, How I Learned to Stop Worrying and Love Local
Antitrust Liability, 11 PEPPERDINE L. REV. 635, 666-685 (1984) (discussing the state legislative
response to City of Boulder, virtually all providing antitrust immunity by "authorizing" local
anticompetitive activity).

